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AppendixA TWO-LEVEL PLANNING PROCEDURE WITH RESPECT TO MAKE-OR-BUY DECISIONS,
INCLUDING COST ALLOCATIONS
Bert R. Meijbooml), Subfaculty of Econometrics, Tilburg University,
P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
Abstract
The paper is concerned with a two-level corporate model. At the
lower level, divisions produce for the external market. They require
certain technical services. The divisions are coordinated by a central
unit at the top level. The central unit must determine the integral plan
of technical services i.e. firm-wide optimal make-or-buy decisions,
without having complete information on the divisíons.
We present a decomposition-based planning procedure during which the
central unit gathers information to derive an optimal make-or-buy deci-
sion while allocating the costs of internal technical services.
The model formulation has substantial significance for the real-
world: a similar organizational structure, informatíon dispersal among
subunits and coupling of divisions and departments is commonly observed
in existing firms. The resulting planning procedure can be interpreted
in terms of planning and budgeting in real organizations.
Key words: Multilevel organization, Decomposition-based planning, Make-
or-buy decisions, Cost allocation
l) The author ts grateful to Prof. Dr. J. Benders, Drs. P. Kort and
ProE. Dr. P. Verheyen for many fruitful discussions and useful sugges-
tions. This research is supported by a grant from the Common Research
Pool of the Tilburg University and the Technical University Eindhoven
(Samenwerkingsorgaan KHT-THE) in the Netherlands.l
1. Introduction
The approaches to planning and budgeting problems in organiza-
tions have become more and more quantitatively oriented. The (seemingly
ever) growing computer facilities and the complexity of decisíon-making
processes are very likely to strengthen this tendency in the future.
Traditionally, input-ouput analysis and linear programming (LP) are im-
portant areas in the field of quantitatíve methods. E.g. in Tilanus
(1976), the fifth paper, by Smits and Verheyen, is devoted to a company-
wide budgeting input-output model, and the sixth paper, by Bouma and
Bosman, accounts for multiple technologies for products by an LP-for-
mulation. Manes et.al. (1982) treat the historic development from input-
output to mixed-integer programming (MIP) models for the so-called reci-
procal service cost problem. Their contribution was the incorporation of
make-or-buy decisions. One possible extension of the analysis of Manes
et.al. is to integrate multiple technologies for products and make-or-
buy decisions with respect to technical servicea in one "integral" model
(see Meijboom (1983)).
The latter model as well as its predecessors belong to the class
of holistic corporate models: the firm is considered as an entity direc-
ted by cq. identified with one single decision-maker. As opposed to the
holístic approach, the present paper treats the make-or-buy problem in a
decentralized multi-level organizatíon.
In any real firm of a reasonable size, a certain degree of decentraliza-
tion has taken place. A number of product divisions and service depart-
ments ~ccur and the information to make decisions ts dtspersed among2
these subunits. Due to the delegation of tasks and responsibilities, the
lower-level managers become local decision-makers, possibly with indivi-
dual goals and preferences.
The topmanagement of the fírm has to coordinate [hese managers. Further-
more, it usually allocates cost of internal services to users and this
might affect the behaviour of the subunits managers (Thomas (1977, pp.
7-8).
Summarizing, many real firms consísts of more or less independently
acting subunits plus a central unit with a coordínating function. The
central unit collects information from subunits to arrive at decisions
and will allocate internal costs during thís planning process. Or,
citing 7.immerman (1979, p. 505): "Cost allocation, manageríal behaviour
and the structure of the organization, including the incentives facing
the managers, are extricably linked".
The paper is organized as follows. The main characteristics of a
real firm and the problems to be analysed are introduced in chapter 2.
The model of the firm is presented in chapter 3 and the issue of cost
allocation is trea[ed in chapter 4.
The search process for an optimal make-or-buy decision can be seen as a
planning procedure with practical significance, as during this procedure
internal costs are allocated. It is discussed extensively in chapter S.
The mathematical background is described separately, in the appendix.3
2. Problem s[atement
2.1. introductlon
We consider a firm that consists of the followíng subunits:
"divisions", "departments" and a"central unit". After describing each
subunit's task, the problem of the firm will be íntroduced. The organi-
zational structure and the way information is dispersed give rise to a
planning procedure to solve this problem.
2.2. Subunits in the firm, organizational structure
The divisions in the firm produce the products that can be sold
on the external market. They operate relatively independent of each
other and we will view them as profit centers.
Definition 1:
A particular amount of products po[entially realizable, by one or more
divisions, is called a product mix.
In doing their task, the divisions require commodities called
technical services (TS). Every TS can be bought externally, from outside
suppliers, but might also be produced internally, in the TS departments.4
Definition 2:
A particular combinatton of make-or-buy decisions, stating which TS will
be produced internally and which TS will be bought externally, is called
a TS alternative.
Beside production supported by TS-ses, the firm has a sector
general services (GS). The GS departments produce common goods from
which the firm as a whole benefíts. This gives rise to common costs.
The central unit of the firm is responsible for the total net
profit i.e. [he sum of divisional profits minus internal-TS costs and
common costs. Furthermore, the output of the departments is not sold
outside the firm, so the central unit must allocate the internal-TS
costs and the common costs to the divisions (cf. Kaplan (1982, p. 353)).
The following two-level organizational structure is presumed:
- At the lower level, we have the divisions. Each of them possesses spe-
cific knowledge with respect to its production processes, market re-
strictions etc., not known to other subunits.
- At the higher level, we have the central unit. It directly controls
the departments but does not have complete information on the divi-
sions.
The divisional two-level structure is a natural consequence of speciali-
zation and decentralization of information in the firm. In particular,
the central unit has incomplete information on divisions.5
2.3. The problem of the firm
Having outlined the main technological, organizational and fi-
nancial features of the firm, we can introduce the problem to be analy-
sed.
Problem of the firm:
Which product-mix, TS alternative and cost allocation mechanism will
maximize the total net profit of the firm?
Under complete information, the optimal product mix and inter-
nal-external alternative can be determined at once. The remaining task
is [hen to allocate costs such that divisional managers have no incen-
tive to object against the firm-wide optimal decísions.
In the present situation however, the information needed to
solve the problem of the firm is díspersed among the subunits of the
firm. The central unit must gather information in order to solve the
problem of the firm. The whole process of solving the problem and then
making sure that actions are carried out according to this solution will
be called the decision-making process. In this paper, we are mainly con-
cerned with the planning phase.6
Definition 3:
Planning is that phase in the decision-making process that involves the
search for the decision (or set of decisions) to be made and carried
out.
We will propose a planning procedure in which information is exchanged
between the two organizational levels during a number of planning ses-
sions. Moreover, common costs and associated interval TS-costs are allo-
cated in each planning session. Now it is an open question what kind of
influence these cost allocations have on the speed and the result of the
planning procedure.
3. The model of the firm
3.1. Mixed-integer programming formulation
In the preceding chapter, a general firm was outlined. Now we
formalize these ideas. We will present the model of a firm with two
divisions and three different types of TS-ses.
The problem of finding an optimal product mix and TS alternatíve
can be formulated as a mixed-integer programming (MIP) model:7
Maximize plxl - dyl
s.t. Alxl - yl - zl
t p2x2 - dy2 - cx~ - dy~ - Fd
0
A2x2 - y2 - z2
t z2 - z~
z~ - (I-A)x~ - y~
d : 0-1 vector
M : large positive constant
The meaning of the vectors and matrices in this problem formulation will
be clarified in the subsequent sections.
3.2. Divisions




B x c b , x ~ 0 (3.2)
n n n ns
represent local restrictions (e.g. maximum outside supply, limited capa-
cities) and opportunities (e.g. multiple technologies for products)
which are only known to the n-th division (n z 1,2) but not to other
subunits or even the central unit. Each xn satisfying (3.2) can be cal-
led a divisional product mix. The perLunit contributions of xn to the
profit are contained in the vector pn.
The matríx An contains the per-unit TS requirements and is pre-
sumed to have nonnegative entries.
TS-ses can be bought externally (yn), against market price d, or can be
obtained from internal departments (zn). Internal production of TS-ses
is treated in the next section. The allocation of internal TS costs is
discussed ín chapter 4.
3.3. TS sectnr
We account for three dífferent types of technical services, de-
noted by TS1, TS2, TS3. The vectors xQ, y~, z~, d are the decision vari-
ables wíth respect to the internal production of TS-ses. Let
R E{1,2,3}. Now z~(R) is the amount of internally produced TSR as avai-
lable for divisions, x~(R) is the total amount of internally produ-
ced TSR, and y~~(R) ís the ~mount of externally bought TSR as used in th~
lnternal productíon of other TS-ses (so not available for divísions).
Internal prodiiction of TSR gíves ríse to (direct) costs
c(R)xp(R) t FR. Here FR equals the fixed costs whenever x~(R) ~ 0. More-
over, the internal production of TSR requires an amount aiRxH(R) of TSi
(i - 1,2,3). The input coefficients aiR form the square matrix A. The
per-unit price for y0(R) is d(R) (just as it is for divisions).The vector d has two functions. Firstly, it guarantees that,
whenever x~(R) ~ 0, the related
objective function. Secondly, by
zo(R) ~ 0, it is guaranteed that
TSR is not produced internally,
towards divisions; they have to
fírm.
fixed cost FR is accounted for in the
the constraints z~(R) - Md(R) c 0 and
x~(R) - 0 implies z~(R) a 0. So, if
then there is no ínternal flow of TSR
buy TSR independently from outstde the
Finally we require that the central unit cannot obtain external
TS-ses via the divisions; it has to buy external TS-ses directly from
outside suppliers, without interference of divisions. Therefore zl, z2
are non-negative.
3.4. Go~il of the firm; common costs
As stated in the objective function of the MIP model, the firm
strives after profit maximization. The expression
plxl - dyl - p2x2 - dy2 - cx~ - dy~ - Fd -: P
can be seen as the gross profít.
Beside production, supported by technical services, the firm has
a sector "general services". The occurrence of this kind of activities,
from which the firm as a whole benefits, gives lead to common costs,
i.e. non-separable costs to be beared by the subunits within the Firm.
These costs may vary in the long run but, in the short run, they are
assumed to be entirely fixed, viz. equal to the (known) constant H.10
Therefore they are not included in the objective function of the MIP
model. Finally, the net profit Pnet can be defined as
P .- P - H.
net
4. Cost allocation requirements
4.1. Cost allocation defined
We want to investigate how the central unit can allocate the
costs of general and (internal) technical services during (the process
of solving the MIY problem, i.e. during) the search for an optimal pro-
duct-mix and internal-external alternative. In the "tradition" of Thomas
(1977) and Zimmerman (1979), we explicitly analyse the link between
planning and cost allocation as this link is most prevalent in practice.
First of all, we have to be more specific on what ís meant by a"cost
allocatíon".
Definition 4:
A cost allocation is the efficient partitioning of a cost among a set of
cost objects. The term "efficient" expresses that all of the cost is
allocated, no more and no less.11
In every cost allocation, three elements are important.
l. The total amount of costs to be allocated. In the present case, this
amount is equal to the common costs and the cost of internal TS-ses.
2. The cost objects among which the costs are to be allocated. Here the
divisions, which are profit centers, are the cost objects.
3. The allocation method or rule that partitions the total costs.
The choice or design of the allocation rule is usually difEicult
in the presence of fixed and hence non-separable costs. Nevertheless,
the following properties are considered most desirable:
- the allocatíon of costs of lnternal TS-ses to a particular division Ss
proportional to the use of internal TS-ses by that division (cf. Kap-
lan (1982, p. 355)).
- on behalf of the firm as a whole, the cost allocations should be such
that the maximum net profit remains the same.
These requirements could be referred to as "fairness" and "optimality
preservation", respectively. Because the common costs are essentially
non-separable, it wi1L be dífficult to allocate them in a fair way.
4.2. The reciprocal allocation method
The reciprocal allocation method (cf. Kaplan (1982, p. 363-372))
ts an allocation method ín whích each type of TS allocates its variable
and fixed costs to other TS-ses and to divisíons on the basis of usage.
If one divides the total redistributed costs of each TS by its produc-
tion volume, one obtains a per-unit price to be charged to users of that12
service. Now we summarize the main formules of the method.
Suppose one has at hand x0, y0, z0, 6 which are feasible with
respect to the MIP model (3.10).
Define the gross amount of TS-ses z as z- x0 t y0 and the corresponding
diagonal matrix Z by ZRR - z(R). For explanatory reasons, we assinne
x0(R)y0(R) - 0 and z(R) ~ 0(R - 1,2,3).
Let F' and c' be the (row) vectors of fixed costs and per-unit direct
costs. So F(R) - F(R)d(R) and c(R) ~ c(R) if x0(R) ~ 0, c(R) - d(k) if
YO(R) ~ 0.
The associated i nput-output matrix A is
A~R :- A~R, if x0(R) ~ 0 ; A~R :- 0, if x0(R) a 0
Now we can give the main formula of the reciprocal allocation method:
the total redistributed costs are the components of the row vector G'
given by
G' :- (c' t F'Z-1)(I-A)-1Z
If we multiply both sldes of (~i.l) with Z 1, we obtxin the per-unit re-
distríbuted costs w', i.e.
w' .- G'Z-1 - (c' f F'Z-1)(I-A)-1 (4.2)
In the following chapter we will see that this price can be used during
the process of finding an optimal product mix and internal-external al-
ternative.13
4.3. Allocation of common costs
As noted earlier, the allocation of common costs will always be
subject to a certain degree of arbítrariness. Here we mention one possi-
bility, namely adding H to one of the components of F'.
5. A planning procedure including cost allocation
5.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter we have developed a MIP model that re-
presents the problem of finding an optimal product-mix and TS alterna-
tive. The mathematical solution algorithm (see Appendix) has a useful
economíc interpretation: it can be seen as a multilevel planning proce-
dure. Moreover, the cost allocation requirements can readily be incorpo-
rated in the procedure. In this paper we will extensively describe and
discuss this planning procedure.
It is worthwhile to view the task of the central unit as a
"make-or-buy problem in extensive Eorm". Thís task consists of the fol-
lowin~; thrc~e ~~roblems:
[P1) Which TS-ses must be produced ínternally?
[P2) How much is required of each internal TS?
[P3] How should the amount of interal TS-ses be divided over the divi-
sions?14
The decision variables related to [P1), [P2] and [P3] are d, zD and
zn, n - 1,2, respectively.
Furthermore the central unit intends to allocate the costs of internal
TS-ses plus the common costs. So the fourth problem is:
[P4] How should the (fixed) common costs and the (fixed and variable)
costs of internal TS-ses be allocated to the divisions?
These four problems, though separately postulated, are interrelated. The
planning procedure to be described decouples [P1] and [P2) from [P3) and
[P4]. The main steps, or sessions, of the procedure are concerned with
the question: how much should be produced internally of which type of
TS? Each maín step, in turn, consists of a number of so-called substeps
in which some constant amount of internal TS-ses is divided over the
divisions while, at the same time, the associated costs are allocated to
users of these services. Now we provide for a detailed description.
5.2. The main steps of the procedure
During the main steps of the planning procedure information is
exchanged between the top level and the second level in the organization
with respect to the total amount of TS-ses to be produced internally.
Nased on the current divisional information as available at the top
level, the central unit computes a particular TS alternative (represen-
ted by dt) and a partícular prod~lction volume of internal TS-ses (re-
presented by ZÓ) plus an "optimistic" estimate pt for the maximum
attaínable profit Popt. This estimate is optimistic in the sense that
the actual maximum attainable profit cannot exceed this estimate. A15
natural test for optímality is now:
"If the divisions use up the amount z~ of internal TS-ses, is the sum of
their profits equal to Pt?"
Before actually performing this test, the central uni[ must
};ather additional information. This involves the optimal distribution of
the amount of internal TS-ses zÓ among the divisions, while simulta-
neously generating a marginal valuation st for zp. These two issues em-
bodie a subproblem, to be discussed in the next section.
For the moment, suppose this subproblem has been solved and let
Pt be the maximum attainable profit, given the amount zp of internal TS-
ses. If the divisions appear to be able to realize the estimate Pt, i.e.
Pt - Pt, the centrai unit concludes that the current volume of internal
'I'S-ses is optimal.
If not so, the marginal valuation st and reported profit Pt form suffi-
cient new information for the central unit to derive a more realistic
estimate
pttl ( ~ Pt) for the maximum attainable profit, with associated
TS alternative
dttl
and updated production volume of i nternal TS-
-tf 1
ses z~ .
5.3. The substeps of the procedure, cost allocations
Now we will analyse the subproblem in more detail. The question
is: given some z~, i.e. some particular amount of internally available
TS-ses, find the maximum attainable profít by the divisions (to be de-
noted by F't) and the asancFated marp,inal valuation of z~ (to be d~~noted
by st)?16
Formally the central unit would like to solve
Maximize plxl - dyl
s.t. Alxl - yl - zl









all xn,yn,zn ~ 0
and is particularly interested in the optimal solution value Pt and an
optimal dual variable associated to the constraint zl f z2 ~ z~.
Apparently, the common use oE internal TS-ses is the only interdepen-
dency between the divisions. The problem of finding the optimal common
use of zÓ can be attacked by applying a price or resource directive
planning procedure (Dirickx and Jennergren (1979, Chapter 6)). In the
sequel, a resource directive approach is described. The steps, or ses-
sions, of this "subprocedure" are called substeps, as they take place
within a particular main step.
In the course of the substeps, the TS alternative dt and the
amount z~ of internally available TS-ses do not change. During the pro-
cess of computing this latest dt and z~, the central unit also derives
the total amount of ínternal TS-ses x~ and the amount of external TS-
ses yt as required in the production of Xt, Of course, these Xt~ yt Zt
0 0 0 0' 0'
dt sa[isEy [he requirements of the MIP model. According to the recipro-
cal allocation method (section 4.2), per-unit pricta Eor internal TS-ses17
can be computed (formula (4.2)), eventually covering common costs as
well -t (see section 4.3). The príce vector w remains constant durín~ the
subs[eps of main step t.
At the beginning of each substep, the central unit computes how
the amount z~ can be fully distributed over the divisions. In other
words, zt is splitted into as, as ~ 0 with as f as a zt. At the same
0 1 2 1 2 0
time, upperbounds Ps (n - 1,2) for each division's maximum attainable
n
profit are computed. Now each divísion is asked to report its own maxi-
mum attainable profit Pn under the restrictions:
1. that its part as of internal TS-ses is fully used up, and
n
2. that it pays the price wt for these internal TS-ses.
Formally, each division solves (n - 1,2):
Maximize p x - dy - wtz
n n n n
s.t. A x - y - z - 0
n n n n
B x c b
n n n




Let P be the optimal solution value of (5.2), i .e. the maximum attain-
n
able profit given an, and let yn be the marginal valuation associated
to as. The central unit will now check if
n
Vs - Ps , n - 1,2.
n n18
If this is so, the central unit has solved the subproblem. It has found
the optimal distribution of the (temporaríly fixed) amount of internal
TS-ses z~ and easily derives the associated maximum attainable profit Pt
given zó as well as the marginal valuation of z~ as required in the main
step of the procedure. Otherwise, for those n with
Ps ~ Ps ~
n n
yn and Pn form sufficient new information to derive improved upperbounds
sfl sfl -sfl -si-1 -t
P1 , P2 and associated distribution al ,a2 . The price w remaíns
the same as z~ has not changed.
6. Discussion
As can be seen from (5.2), each division is obliged to use up
its amount as of internal 1'S-ses, so that the costs allocated to such a
n
division will be constant, viz. wt z~ wt as, independent of the divi-
n n
~;lonnl proflt. (1n the other hand, hec~wse the divlsion considers wt nN ri
per-unít ciiarge for LnternaL TS-ses, its marginal valuation of as will n
turn out to be exactly wt lower than in the case without cost allocation
-t
(i.e. w- 0). As a result, the information exchange between divísion
and central unit is not essentially disturbed, because the central unit
immediately "reconstructs" the correct marginal valuation.
The cost allocations in thís form do not influence ( e.Q. speed
up) the planning procedure i n comparison with the case without cost19
, allocation. However, the planning procedure is realistic, because in
practíce (the topmanagement of) many firms allocate (full!) costs (e.g.
tiee Zimmerman (1979)). The present paper gives conditions imder whích
full costing can be applied without provoking sub-optimality.
Summarizing, we have presented a planning procedure for a divi-
sionalized organization that faces make-or-buy decisions for certain
technícal services. Decentralization features are explicitly accounted
for and a well-known and useful cost allocation mechanism is integrated
in the planning process. The underlying model as well as the proposed
procedure captnre elemenrti nf the practtce of decislon-makíng. Takinr
thc~ ~~ccurrencr oE tull-costing practices for granted ln real-world
firms, it is the question whether full costing can improve the pianning
process. The present contribution is a step towards solution of this
problem, as conditions are given under which full-costing at least does
not damage the planning process.20
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Appendix. The solution alKorithm for the MIP problem
A1. Introduction
This section is concerned with a solution algorithm for the MIP
problem (3.1). The presentation does not províde for a complete develop-
ment of the algorithm. For the mathematical correctness, in particular
the convergence properties, we refer to Lasdon (1970) and Dírlckx and
Jennergren (1979).
Roughly speaking, the algorithm proceeds as follows.
We partition the variables z0, x0, y0, d from the remaining variables.
Then a two-level solutíon algorithm very similar to Benders' partitio-
ning method (see Lasdon (1970, pp. 370-381) is applied, in which z0, x0,
y~, d are iteratively held Fixed. The iterations of this alqorithm are
called the main iterations.
The associated subproblem has a block-angular structure and is solved by
a decomposition method. This is, in turn, an iterative two-level algo-
rithm, whose iterations are called subiterations.
A2. The main ile~rations
F.ach iteration starts with the solution of a so-called restric-
ted upper problem (RUP). This yields a(trial) solution, say pt Zt -t
' 0' x0,2z
y~, dt. This solution is optimal if Pt --cx~ - dy~ - Fdt f sz~ f
vlbl f vZb2 for all (ul,vl,u2,v2,s) satisfying
u A t v B ~ p





n - 1,2 (A1)
Therefore we solve the (dual) subproblem (A2), t.e.
Minimize vlbl f v2b2 t sz~ subject to (A1) (A2)
Let (ui,vi,u2,v2,st) be an optimal dual solution to (A2) with solution
value Pt. Now we must check if pt - Pt.
If this condition is fullfilled, then the trial solution
(Pt,z~,x~,y~,dt) i s globally optimal.
Otherwise, if Pt ~ Pt, the RUP has to be extended with the constraint
P t-cxp - dy~ - Fd f stz~ f vibl f v2b2
and then be resolved, thus leading to Pt}1, zQ}1 etc.
The iterations of this procedure are called the main iterations.
The only problem left is the solution of the subproblem (A2).23
A3. The subiterations
For each fixed zÓ, the primal subproblem is:
Maximize
plxl - dyl } p2x2 - dy2







all xn,yn,zn ~ 0
This block-angular LP problem can be solved by price or resource direc-
tive decomposition algorithms. Below the latter approach is outlined. We
apply a variant of Benders' method as described in Dirickx and Jenner-
gren (1979, pp. 66-69).
In each iteration, a restricted subproblem (RSP) is solved,
which leads to a(trial) solution say Pi,ai,PZ,a2. For these values
a~t,a2, two lower subproblems are solved:24
Maximize p x - dy
n n n
s.t. A x - y - z - ~
n n n n






"s "s ~s 's "s "s
Let (xn,yn,zn; an,Bn,Yn) be a primal-dual paír of optimal solutions. Let
Ps .- P xs - dys (n - 1,2).
n n n n
If for each n Pn - Pn, then optimality of the SP has been achieved.
(Now it is not difficult to derive optimal dual variables ui,v~,u2,v2,s2
as required f.or the solutíon (A2).)
If for some n Pn ~ Pn, constraints have to be added to the RSP, which
is then to be resolved. We call the iterations of the just outlined pro-
cedure subiterations. Note that these subiterations are requíred within
a particular main iterattons ín order to solve the SP of that main ite-
ration.
A4. Modífication of the algoritm, cost allocation
Consider (A3), to be referred to as the original subproblem, for
certain fixed z~. Choose somr~ w which has the same dimension as z~. if
we add the term
w(z~ - zl - ... - zn) (A4)25
in the objective function, the optimal solution value wiil not change.





in the "perturbed" version of the subproblem, then s~ f w is an optimal
dual variable associated to the same constraint in the original subpro-
blem.
Altogether, the addition of the term (A4) does not really dis-
turt the optimum oE the original subproblem. If we keep w fixed during
the subiterations, the solution algorithm for (A3) as proposed in the
previous section, will still yield an optimal solution to (A3), while
the dual information is easily corrected in order to be used in the main
iterations. Now w can be taken such that
1. all (fixed and variable) costs of internal costs are equal to wz~;
2. all ínternal TS-costs plus the common costs H are equal to wz~.
It depends on which cost components the central unit wants to allocate,
whether 1. or 2. (or even another alternative) is chosen. So this sec-
tion merely provides for allocation opportunities than for allocation
rules. Finally, the proposed method fails if all components of z~ are
zero. The only internal costs are the common costs H but we cannot allo-
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